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THE HAPPIEST XENOPHOBES ON EARTH: EXAMINING ANTI-
IMMIGRANT SENTIMENTS IN THE NORDIC COUNTRIES 
Maggie Zeisset 
Abstract: The Nordic countries (Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland and Iceland) are 
widely known as progressive, open and tolerant. However, in recent years these 
countries have witnessed growing intolerance towards immigrants, particularly 
Muslims. This intolerance is manifested in violent attacks against foreigners and the rise 
of far right, exclusionary populist parties. This paper seeks to understand what causes 
some citizens in these Nordic countries to embrace anti-immigrant xenophobic attitudes 
and other citizens to, not only reject, but to fight such views.   
INTRODUCTION 
For most, the Nordic countries (Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland and Iceland) 
epitomize liberalism and tolerance. All of the Nordic countries rank in the top ten of the 
happiest countries in the world, with Norway placed at the top; and are all known as 
leaders in healthcare, education and eco-friendly innovations. The Nordic group also 
contains some of the richest countries in the world. Partially due to oil revenues, all five 
ranked in the top thirty-highest gross domestic product per capita countries in 2015. On 
the surface, at least, the Nordic countries appear to be open societies with progressive 
social norms, happy citizens, generous welfare states, and strong social solidarity. Upon 
closer observation, however, the picture becomes more complicated, particularly when it 
comes to anti-immigrant xenophobia.  
Up “until 2001, Norway, Sweden and Denmark could be seen as a fairly liberal 
bastion in the north of Europe," Rune Berglund Steen, the director of the Norwegian 
Center against Racism, told the Washington Post (Noack 2015). Recently, however, there 
have been signs that the Nordic countries are losing their reputation for tolerance. This 
can be seen from the rise of Radical Right Parties (RRPs), which espouse nativist and 
xenophobic rhetoric and policies. In June the anti-immigration Danish People’s Party 
emerged from the elections as the second-largest political party with 21% of the votes, 
compared to their 12% vote in the prior election (Eddy 2015). The Swedish elections in 
September 2014 produced similar results with the far right Sweden Democrats becoming 
the third-largest party, more than doubling their performance from four years earlier 
(Shapiro 2015). In April 2014, the nationalist-oriented Finns Party emerged as the 
second-largest party and in Norway, the far right Progress Party teamed up with the 
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Conservatives to win the election in 2013, entering government for the first time 
(Paterson 2013).  
Further, for countries with generally low crime rates, there has been a pronounced 
multicultural backlash marked by an uptick in the violence surrounding immigrants. 
Between December and February of 2015 alone, two major attacks happened in Sweden. 
On January 1st a mosque was firebombed, making it the third one bombed in Sweden 
since Christmas. The mosques were tagged with swastikas as well (Shapiro 2015). Then, 
in Denmark on February 14, two shootings took place in Copenhagen within hours of 
each other, killing two and wounding five. The assailant was a Muslim Danish citizen 
with ties to Islamic extremists (Gargiulo, Botelho, and Almasy 2015). Denmark’s 
response has been to drastically cut refugees’ rights and benefits and discourage asylum 
seekers.  
Elsewhere, too, the Syrian migrant crisis appears to be intensifying hostile 
attitudes and policies toward outsiders. Norway, the richest of the Nordic countries, has 
threatened to charge anyone who tries to help refugees enter the country from the Arctic 
Circle with human trafficking (Noack 2015). Finland’s government has also shown a 
reluctance to accept more refugees; and though the governments of Sweden and Iceland 
have been more welcoming of migrants and refugees in this current crisis, it is clear that 
even Sweden is becoming reluctant to take on more migration (Noack 2015).  
The evidence is all around: xenophobia is on the rise, even in the Nordic states, 
but not all citizens agree with each other or with their governments regarding 
immigration. The question, then, is what causes some individuals to adopt anti-immigrant 
xenophobic attitudes while others, who have experienced relatively the same political 
context and country demographics, remain more tolerant? This is an important question, 
because anti-immigrant xenophobic attitudes have been identified as key drivers of RRP 
support (Rydgren 2003; van der Brug et al. 2000, 2003, 2009; Hjerm and Bohman 2014). 
RRPs create anti-immigrant legislation and increase xenophobic (particularly anti-
Muslim immigrant) rhetoric (Hjerm and Bohman 2014). Understanding what drives anti-
immigrant xenophobic attitudes would be a first step in preventing RRPs from gaining 
more power and perpetuating negative frames around immigrants and immigration 
(Hjerm and Bohman 2014).  It would also be a start in preventing anti-immigrant and 
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anti-migrant violence. The literature provides three broad approaches to explaining 
political intolerance and anti-immigrant xenophobia in particular: social group 
characteristics, sense of threat, and cultural attitudes/ideology.   
SOCIAL GROUP CHARACTERISTIC 
 Religiosity  
The idea that religion is a determinant of racist or xenophobic attitudes has been 
strongly researched within the psychology of religion literature, but there is some 
disagreement about the nature of that relationship. Scholars have argued that intrinsically 
religious people internalize religious values related to “humility, compassion and love of 
neighbor” (Allport and Ross 1967, 441) and are therefore tolerant in their views towards 
others, including outsiders. Those who are more extrinsically religious tend to be more 
“utilitarian and more dogmatic in their social attitudes as well as their religion” (Ekici 
and Yucel 2014, 108), and therefore are more prejudiced against others, particularly those 
they view as Other (Park et al. 1990; Rowatt and Kirkpatrick 2002; Salsman et al. 2005). 
Research has also found that religious particularism, that is “to what extent people 
believe there is only one true religion” (Ekici and Yucel 2014, 108) will increase 
prejudice, while doctrinal beliefs (subscribing to religious beliefs) decrease prejudice 
(Ekici and Yucel 2014; Eisinga et al. 1995; Konig et al. 2000; Glock and Stark 1966; 
Scheepers et al. 2002b). Individual spirituality should decrease prejudice (Hood et al. 
1996; Scheepers et al. 2002b; Ekici and Yucel 2014). Hjerm and Bohman argue that non-
religious people are on average more likely to oppose immigration than strongly religious 
people (2014). They also argue that religious people in Protestant countries and in 
countries with a low proportion of majority adherents are more tolerant than religious 
people in Catholic countries and in religiously homogenous countries (2014). In this 
study, all of the cases are majority Protestant and also secularized. From this literature it 
is possible to derive the following testable hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Those who have doctrinal beliefs will be more tolerant than those 
who adhere to religious particularism.  
Hypothesis 2: Those who are individually spiritual will be more tolerant of 
immigrants than those who adhere to religious particularism.   
Age, Gender, and Education 
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The empirical literature suggests that the typical profile of xenophobes is older, 
less educated, and male. Women, some argue, are less likely to have racial prejudice than 
their male counterparts (Ekici and Yucel 2014; Strabac and Listhaug 2008; Lewin-
Epstein and Levanon 2005). Mudde argues that this is because, whether by biology or 
structural placement in the economy, women more often hold nurturance roles (2007). 
Age also seems to play a role in prejudice or xenophobic attitudes. Researchers argue that 
the younger generations tend to be more educated and more open-minded than the older 
generation (Roemer and Van der Straeten 2004; Knudsen 1997; Ekici and Yucel 2014).  
Hence, older people would be expected to be more xenophobic and less tolerant of 
difference in general. This, however, cuts against the empirical reality that the support 
base of most RRPs tends to be young. Part of the explanation may lie in education and 
occupational sector. Individuals with higher levels of skill are more likely to be pro-
immigration in high per capita gross domestic product (GDP) countries, while lower level 
skilled workers will be more likely to have anti-immigrant xenophobic attitudes 
(Yakusko 2009; O’Rourke 2004; Mayda 2004). The Nordic countries all have high GDP 
per capita, so it should follow that high skilled workers within those countries will be 
more tolerant. Education levels have also been linked to the idea that higher skilled 
workers will have had more education and, therefore, will be more tolerant than those 
will a lower education (Mayda 2004; Bohman 2011; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2009; 
Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; Kunovich, 2004). 
Hypothesis 3: Women will be slightly less xenophobic than men. 
Hypothesis 4: Young people will be slightly more tolerant of immigrants than the 
older generation. 
Hypothesis 5: More highly educated people will be less likely to exhibit anti-
immigrant xenophobia. 
 
Sense of Threat  
 According to both group threat theory and group conflict theory, when two groups 
compete for limited resources or the same goal, frustrations arise and exacerbate conflict, 
prejudice, and discrimination. When groups are, or perceive themselves to be, in conflict 
with other groups for valued resources such as money or power, intergroup tensions and 
prejudice may surface (Ekici and Yucel 2014, Weldon 2006). Specifically, unemployed 
individuals appear to have significantly higher anti-immigrant prejudice; and those with 
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less wealth are more likely to express racial prejudice (Strabac and Listhaug 2008; Ekici 
and Yucel 2014). Group threat theory, in turn, differentiates between two different kinds 
of perceived threat, specifically “realistic” and “symbolic” (Weldon 2006; Schlueter et al. 
2008; Tolsma et al. 2008; Savelkoul et al. 2011; Hooghe et al. 2013; Ekici and Yucel 
2014). Limited jobs and other valued resources in the economy are examples of realistic 
threats. Symbolic perceived threat, on the other hand, involves the idea that the outgroup 
might disrupt the cultural and religious values of the majority group. 
Much of the literature argues that those with lower socioeconomic status will have 
stronger anti-immigrant xenophobic attitudes than those with higher socioeconomic 
status (Coenders and Scheepers 2003; Svallfors 2006; Weldon 2006; Ekici and Yucel 
2014). Other research claims that during a slow economy natives may be more liable to 
scapegoat immigrants and ethnic minorities. The state of the economy as a whole may 
influence citizens’ attitudes more than their own personal situations. Consequently, 
tolerance should rise in prosperous times and decline when the economy is in recession 
(Weldon 2006). Economic instability has been shown to activate xenophobic attitudes, 
especially when there is a perceived threat that foreigners are taking away jobs from 
native workers (Yakushko 2009; Watts 1996; Radkiewicz 2003). It stands to reason that 
individuals within these countries that are experiencing unemployment or economic 
instability will be more xenophobic because these individuals will feel more threatened, 
perceiving foreigners to be a new competition for economic resources. Therefore, when 
unemployment rates increase, intolerance towards immigrants may also increase. The 
threat literature also notes that individual-level xenophobia may be stimulated as much or 
more by a sense of cultural threat than by the fear of job loss. This aspect of perceived 
threat can be manifested through an individual’s attitudes and ideology, forming a third 
broad approach to explaining anti-immigrant xenophobia. From this it is possible to 
derive the following: 
Hypothesis 6: Less affluent individuals will be more likely to exhibit anti-
immigrant xenophobia. 
Hypothesis 7: Those who are experiencing unemployment will be more likely to 
exhibit anti-immigrant xenophobia. 
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Nationalism 
 It stands to reason that individuals who feel a strong sense of national pride will 
feel threatened by and hostile to out-group members. Research has argued that individual 
and group national identity focus results in stronger negative views of foreigners. The 
research also argues that nationalism, or belief in the superiority of one’s nation over 
others, affects xenophobia (Esses, Dovidio, Semenya, and Jackson 2005; Yagushko 
2009). There is a particular form of nationalism, at the ideological core of nativism, one 
in which foreign influences are viewed as suspicious and are seen to harbor the 
possibility of a dangerous attack from within (Ward 2014). O’Rourke (2004) argues that 
anti-immigrant preferences are partially caused by strong feelings of national identity, 
coupled with an associated set of patriotic and nationalist attitudes, including pride in 
country and sense of national superiority. The following hypotheses can be derived: 
Hypothesis 8: Those that feel a strong sense of nationalism will be more 
xenophobic than those with less expressed national pride.  
 
Satisfaction 
 According to Weldon (2006) satisfaction with democracy is one of the three key 
variables shown to predict tolerance. Citizens who feel dissatisfied with the democratic 
functioning in their country have been shown to exhibit anti-immigrant xenophobic 
attitudes (Knigge 1998; Kestila 2006; Dowley and Silve 2007). The status of immigrants 
as “foreigners” makes them easy targets for many who feel frustrated with the democratic 
process. 
Weldon (2006) also identifies another type of satisfaction that has been shown to 
be an indicator for anti-immigrant attitudes. This research argues that strong in-group 
identities, low self-esteem, and perceptions of threat play a significant role in tolerance 
judgments. Studies have shown that those who feel unhappy with their own lives, along 
with other factors, will be more xenophobic than those who are happy or content. Those 
who were unhappy with their own lives tended to see immigrants as not only a threat to 
their country and economic status, but also to their personal happiness and well-being 
(Holman 1994, Weldon 2006, Hjerm and Nagayoshi 2011). Hence: 
Hypothesis 9: Satisfaction with and trust in government will reduce anti-
immigrant xenophobia. 
Hypothesis 10: Those who identify as satisfied with their lives will be less likely 
to exhibit anti-immigrant xenophobia. 
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Ideology and Political Interest  
Political interest and ideological position are two individual attributes of interest. 
The degree of political interest might influence the effects of political articulation 
because less politically interested individuals pay less attention, therefore they might 
attach less meaning to what is said by politicians. Politically aware individuals, on the 
other hand, may be more inclined to absorb certain messages if promoted by political 
elites that have their attention and values (Zaller, 1992, Bohman 2011). The reverse effect 
could also be possible. Limited interest in political positions may reinforce such effects, 
instead of reducing them. However, research has shown that right-leaning individuals are 
generally more likely to hold negative attitudes towards minorities than individuals on the 
left (Gorodzeisky, 2011; McLaren, 2003; Semyonov et al., 2008; Bohman 2011). From 
this literature it is possible to derive the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 11: Those that are right-leaning ideologically will be more likely to 
exhibit anti-immigrant xenophobia than those that lean to the left.  
Hypothesis 12: Those who are more politically aware will be more tolerant 
towards immigrants. 
 
Table 1: Hypotheses 
Social Group Characteristics 
Hypothesis 1: Those who have doctrinal beliefs will be more tolerant than those who adhere to religious 
particularism.  
Hypothesis 2: Those who are individually spiritual will be more tolerant of immigrants than those who 
adhere to religious particularism. 
Hypothesis 3: Women will be slightly less xenophobic than men. 
Hypothesis 4: Young people will be slightly more tolerant of immigrants than the older generation. 
Hypothesis 5: More highly educated people will be less likely to exhibit anti-immigrant xenophobia. 
Sense of Economic Threat 
Hypothesis 6: Less affluent individuals will be more likely to exhibit anti-immigrant xenophobia. 
Hypothesis 7: Those who are experiencing unemployment will be more likely to exhibit anti-immigrant 
xenophobia. 
Sense of Cultural or Lifestyle Threat 
Hypothesis 8: Those that feel a strong sense of nationalism will be more xenophobic than those with less 
expressed national pride.  
Hypothesis 9: Satisfaction with and trust in government will reduce anti-immigrant xenophobia. 
Hypothesis 10: Those who identify as satisfied with their lives will be less likely to exhibit anti-immigrant 
xenophobia. 
Hypothesis 11: Those that are right-leaning ideologically will be more likely to exhibit anti-immigrant 
xenophobia than those that lean to the left.  
Hypothesis 12: Those who are more politically aware will be more tolerant towards immigrants. 
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RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
The current study marshals survey data from the 2008 European Values Survey 
(EVS) in order to test hypotheses derived from three competing approaches to explaining 
intolerance toward minorities (defined as immigrants). By analyzing individual responses 
among only the Nordic countries, it is possible to control for broad cultural and 
developmental similarities, such as, purchasing power parity (PPP)/per capita, human 
development, gender empowerment, strong left wing parties, and shared cultural history. 
This makes it possible to control for some of those broad country-level features and hone 
in on the individual level factors that cause individuals to differ in their attitudes toward 
immigrant outsiders. Nordic xenophobes are not intolerant because they come from a 
poor or economically unstable country or a Catholic-conservative cultural environment. 
Other factors must account for variations between xenophobes and non-xenophobes and 
in the level of xenophobia across countries within the Nordic bloc.  
Graph 1 shows the variation between countries. Those that were scored as a (3) or 
(4) on the intolerance scale were grouped together as those who answered enough 
questions to be considered xenophobic towards immigrants. From this graph, Norway 
and Sweden stand out. Norway has the highest percentage of those who exhibit anti-
immigrant xenophobia with fifty-nine percent of those surveyed in Norway scoring as a 
(3) or (4) on the intolerance scale. Sweden, on the other hand, only has around 40 percent 
of those surveyed answering questions in an anti-immigrant xenophobic attitude. That is 
nearly a 20-point difference. This could mean that there are some country-specific 
variables that this study has not picked up on. There might have been something specific, 
culturally or politically, happening in 2007 in either of these countries that caused this 
difference. The rise of RRPs at different times in these countries could also contribute. 
The 2008 EVS dataset includes all necessary individual level information to code 
for anti-immigrant xenophobia, as well as all of the independent variables identified in 
the literature review. The dependent variable, anti-immigrant xenophobia, involves a 
composite scale created from 13 separate question items that dealt with intolerance 
towards. The EVS asked, for example, whether respondents feel that immigrants are a 
strain on the country, if immigrants make crime problems worse, and if immigrants are a 
threat to the country immigrants (See Appendix for full list of questions). Respondents 
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were also asked if they would not want any group of people as neighbors. This question 
included Muslims and immigrants among the choices. In all thirteen questions those who 
gave an intolerant answer were coded as (1), while all other responses were coded as (0), 
to create a 13-point summative scale. That scale was later collapsed into 1-4 scale 
running from least-to-most intolerant. 
 For the satisfaction with government variable an index was created using three 
2008 EVS questions. These questions asked individuals how confident they were with 
their government, how satisfied they are with democracy in their country and how they 
believe things are going with their government. Those that answered positively were 
coded as (1) and those who answered negatively were coded as (0). Similarly, in order to 
measure the “satisfaction with self” variable two EVS questions were summed. One 
question asked how satisfied respondents are with their lives in general. Respondents that 
answered they were satisfied were coded as (1) and those who were not satisfied were 
coded as (0). The second question asked respondents how happy they are. Those that 
answered very happy or quite happy were coded as (1) and those that answered not very 
happy or not happy at all were coded as (0).  
  The ideology variable also reflects a summative scale based on three EVS 
questions. The first question asked the respondents to place their political views on a 
left/right scale from 1-10, 1 being left and 10 being right. Those that answered between 1 
and 3 were coded as (0), while those that answered between 4 and 6 were coded as (1). 
Those that answered 7 or 8 were coded as (2) and those who answered 9 or 10 were 
coded as (3). The second and third questions were handled in the same manner. 
Respondents were asked if they would vote in an election. If they answered yes they were 
then asked in a separate what party they would vote for and if they answered no then they 
were asked what party most appeals to them. EVS then placed their answer on a left/right 
scale based on what party they chose. The responses were then coded the same way as 
the first question.  
 For political interest three EVS questions were summed. The first question asked 
respondents if they volunteered for any political organizations or parties. Those that 
answered yes were coded as (1), while all others were coded as (0). The second question 
asked if respondents they would vote if there was an election tomorrow. Those that 
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answered yes were coded as (1) and those who said no were coded as (0). The third 
question asked how interested the respondent was in politics. If the respondent answered 
“very interested” the response was coded as (2) and those that answered somewhat 
interested were coded as (1). Those who answered not very or not at all interested were 
coded as (0). 
 For religiosity, a scale was created using five EVS questions. These questions 
asked respondents how often they attend church, how often they pray, if they believe in 
heaven, and if they consider themselves religious. For church attendance and prayer 
frequency, those that said they attended church more than once a week or prayed 
everyday or more than once a week were coded as (2) and those that said they attended 
church or prayed once a week were coded as (1). All others were coded as (0). For the 
other questions, those that answered that they considered themselves as religious were 
coded as (1) and those that said they believed in heaven were also coded as (1). All other 
answered were coded as (0). In order to only capture Christian religiosity, responses were 
selected only if the respondent self-identified as Protestant, Catholic or free church/non-
conformist/evangelical. Following previous literature, variables were created for those 
who identify as individually spiritual and those that exhibit religious particularism (or the 
idea that there is one true religion). Those that answered that they believed there was 
some sort of spirit or life force, but not a personal God were coded as (1) and all others 
were coded as (0). Those that answered that they believed there was only one true 
religion were coded as (2) and those who believed there was only one true religion, but 
that other religions do contain some basic truths were coded as (1). All others were coded 
as (0). 
 Gender was recoded to reflect the category expected to exhibit anti-immigrant 
xenophobic attitudes (male=1 and female=0). Age was treated the same way with those 
who were aged 15-24 as (1), 25-34 as (2), 35-44 as (3), 45-54 as (4) and 55 or older as 
(5). Education responses were given according to the highest level of education 
completed and were recoded by EVS as low (1), middle (2) and high (3).  Those who are 
employed were coded as (1) and those who are unemployed were coded as (0). 
Nationalism was measured by how proud the respondent was to be a citizen of his or her 
country. Those who were very proud were coded as (2) and those who were quite proud 
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were coded as (1). All other answers were coded as (0). Wealth was coded based on the 
monthly income in Euros. The monthly income was used because Sweden was one of the 
few countries to not be given the yearly income question. The variable was recoded so 
that those who made 999 Euros a month of under were coded as (1). Those who made 
1,000 Euros to 4,999 Euros a month were coded as (2) and those who made 5,000 Euros 
or more were coded as (3). Appendix 1 contains all EVS questions used. 
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
The following analysis begins with bivariate correlations in order to offer an 
initial test of the hypotheses. A linear regression model is then used to more directly test 
the strongest variables from each school of thought against one another.  
Bivariate Results 
Bivariate correlations shown in Table 2 support the hypotheses presented for the 
social group characteristics variables and confirm much of the prior literature. Aside from 
Christian religiosity, all of the variables are significant. Religious particularism and 
individual spirituality are both significant and support the first and second hypotheses. 
Those who believe that there is only one true religion are more likely to be intolerant 
towards immigrants, while those who recognize that there is some sort of spirit or life 
force are less likely to be xenophobic. The most significant and robust variable among 
the three religion variables is religious particularism, which may point to a shift towards 
anti-Muslim sentiments and zero-sum cultural rhetoric.  
Age, gender and education correlate with intolerance as predicted. Gender and 
education are statistically significant and negatively correlated with intolerance towards 
immigrants. Age has a statistically significant positive correlation with intolerance 
towards immigrants. Therefore, those with higher education will be less likely to be 
intolerant towards immigrants. Males and the older generations are slightly more likely to 
be intolerant towards immigrants.  
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix of Variables (Social Group Characteristics) 
Independent Variable 
(Intolerance) 
 
Education                              -.179** 
Gender                                -.086** 
Age                                         .030* 
Christian Religiosity .017 
Religious 
Particularism 
.106** 
Individually Spiritual -.056** 
* - Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
** - Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
The hypotheses presented for economic sense of threat (shown in Table 3) predict 
that those who are employed, as well as those with high income will be less likely to be 
intolerant towards immigrants. There is a significant negative correlation between 
employment and intolerance, as well as income and intolerance. This provides support for 
the sense of threat theory, and economic threat in particular.  
Table 3: Correlation Matrix of Variables (Sense of Economic Threat) 
Independent 
Variable 
(Intolerance) 
 
Employment -.081** 
Income in Euros -.063** 
* - Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
** - Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
 
However, these two variables are not as robust or significant as the variables 
associated with the sense of cultural or lifestyle threat (shown in Table 4). Some of these 
cultural threat variables are the most statistically significant out of all the variables. 
Hypothesis eight predicts that those who describe themselves as nationalist are more 
likely to show intolerance towards immigrants. Bivariate correlations bear this out. 
Hypotheses nine and ten predict that satisfaction with government and satisfaction with 
self will both negatively correlate with intolerance. This is also supported at a statistically 
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significant level. However, government satisfaction is more significant than self 
satisfaction. Political interest is also one of the most significant variables. It shows a 
negative correlation with intolerance towards immigrants. This is interesting because 
there has been debate in the literature about whether political interest will increase or 
decrease one’s intolerance. This finding might be different if the countries studied were 
more diverse, with a more right-wing centered state. Ideology was the strongest 
correlation found. As predicted, there is a positive correlation between right-wing 
ideology and intolerance towards immigrants. The strongest variables from each school 
of thought can be seen in their own bivariate table (Table 5). 
Table 4: Correlation Matrix of Variables (Sense of Cultural or Lifestyle Threat) 
Independent Variable 
(Intolerance) 
 
Ideology .201** 
Political Interest -.138** 
Nationalism .198** 
Government Satisfaction -.106** 
Self Satisfaction -.067** 
*- Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
** - Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
 
 Table 5: Correlation Matrix of Variables (Strongest Variables by School) 
Independent Variable 
(Intolerance) 
 
Education -.179** 
Religious Particularism .106** 
Employment -.081** 
Income in Euros -.063** 
Ideology .201** 
Political Interest -.138** 
National Pride .198** 
* - Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
** - Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
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Multivariate Results 
Results of an OLS regression model are presented in Table 6. The strongest 
independent variables for each of the three schools were selected from the bivariate 
correlation results: social group characteristics (religious particularism and education), 
sense of economic threat (income and employment), and political ideology and attitudes 
(ideology, nationalism and political interest). As can be seen in the table, all seven 
variables remain statistically significant. However, the economic threat indicators appear 
weakest and least significant, when other factors are held constant. This stands in contrast 
to the more robust and significant indicators of ideology, nationalism, and political 
interest, suggesting that in the Nordic countries the perception of immigrants as economic 
threat has shifted to a perception of immigrants as a cultural threat. This is in keeping 
with the growing perception of cultural threat from Muslims, so that Islamophobia may 
now be the dominant form of anti-minority sentiment in Europe. Michelle Hale Williams 
argues that RRP rhetoric and xenophobia has shifted from a fear of immigrants as an 
economic threat to the fear of Muslim immigrants as a cultural threat (2007). This shift is 
consistent with the findings in this study. The relatively modest model R2  (.138) suggests 
that there is much variance yet to be explained in anti-immigrant intolerance among 
Nordic publics. Future research could examine this aspect more clearly, by using 
specifically anti-Muslim xenophobia, instead of anti-immigrant xenophobia. 
Table 6: Multivariate Model  
Variable B S.E. Sig. 
Religious Particularism .172 .033 .000 
Education -.193 .017 .000 
Income in Euros -.067 .027 .015 
Employment -.076 .029 .010 
Ideology .111 .008 .000 
Nationalism .191 .018 .000 
Political Interest -.149 .014 .000 
Adjusted R2 = .138    
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CONCLUSIONS 
For years the Nordic countries have been seen as the “almost nearly perfect 
people” because of their progressive social norms, generous welfare, happy citizens and 
tolerance (Booth 2014). However, underneath this strong liberalism, there is a growing 
strain of anti-immigrant xenophobia. This can be seen in the rise of Radical Right Parties, 
a vicious multicultural backlash in countries with extraordinarily low crime rates, and 
reluctance to accept more immigrants. This study sought to understand why some citizens 
adopt anti-immigrant xenophobic attitudes while others, who have experienced relatively 
the same political context and country demographics remain more tolerant. Scholars have 
argued for three different explanations: social group characteristics, sense of economic 
threat and sense of cultural or lifestyle threat. In the past, sense of economic threat had 
been considered a major indicator of xenophobia. However, in this study economic threat 
seemed to be less of an indicator when compared with sense of cultural or lifestyle threat. 
In fact, sense of cultural or lifestyle threat appears to be the most significant driver of 
intolerance. This could be because a shift is starting to take place that is more concerned 
with the fear of Muslim immigrants as threats to the culture and security of a country, 
instead of as an economic threat. Despite which explanation is correct or the most 
significant, the problem remains the same: anti-immigrant xenophobia is prevalent and is 
affecting even the most tolerant and open-minded countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 RES PUBLICA XXI 
 
 
16 
 
REFERENCES 
Bohman, A. 2011. “Articulated Antipathies: Political Influence on Anti-Immigrant 
Attitudes.” International Journal of Comparative Sociology: 457–77.  
Coenders, Marcel, and Peer Scheepers. “The Effect Of Education on Nationalism and 
Ethnic Exclusionism: An International Comparison.” Political Psychology: 313–
43.  
Eddy, Rachel. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/09/09/when-
it-comes-to-refugees-scandinavia-isnt-quite-the-promised-land/ 
Eisinga, R., Konig, R., & Scheepers, P. 1995. “Orthodox religious beliefs and anti-
Semitism: A replication of Glock and Stark in the Netherlands.” Journal for the 
Scientific Study of Religion, 34, 214–223. 
Ekici, Tufan, and Deniz Yucel. 2014. “What Determines Religious And Racial Prejudice 
in Europe? The Effects of Religiosity and Trust.” Soc Indic Res Social Indicators 
Research: 105–33. 
Esses, V. M., Dovidio, J. F., Semenya, A. H., & Jackson, L. M. 2005. “Attitudes toward   
immigrants and immigration: The role of national and international identity.” In 
D. Abrams, M. A. Hogg, & J. M. Marques (eds.), The social psychology of 
inclusion and exclusion (pp. 317-337). London: Psychology Press. 
European Values Survey, 2008. 
Glock, C. Y., & Stark, R. 1966. Christian beliefs and anti-Semitism. New York: Harper 
& Row. 
Gorodzeisky A 2011. “Who are the Europeans that Europeans prefer? Economic 
conditions and exclusionary views toward European immigrants.” International 
Journal of Comparative Sociology 52(1–2): 100–113. 
Gorodzeisky A and Semyonov M 2009. “Terms of exclusion: Public views towards 
admission and allocation of rights to immigrants in European countries.” Ethnic 
and Racial Studies 32(3): 401. 
Hainmueller J and Hiscox MJ 2007. “Educated preferences: Explaining attitudes toward 
immigration in Europe.” International Organization 61(2): 399–442. 
Hjerm, Mikael, and Kikuko Nagayoshi. 2011. “The composition of the minority 
population as a threat: Can real economic and cultural threats explain 
RES PUBLICA XXI  	  
 
17 	  
xenophobia?”. International Sociology 26 (6). 
http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy.iwu.edu/login.aspx?direct=true& 
db=snh&AN=66816381&site=eds-live&scope=site (Accessed September 3, 
2015). 
Hjerm, Mikael and Andrea Bohman. 2014. “Is It Getting Worse? Anti-Immigrants 
Attitudes in Europe during the 21th Century.” In European Populism and 
Winning the Immigration Debate, ed. Sandelind, Clara. Stockholm: Fores.  
Hood, R. W., Spilka, B., Hunsberger, B., & Gorsuch, R. L. 1996. The psychology of 
religion: An empirical approach. New York: Guilford Press. 
Hooghe, M., Meeusen, C., & Quintelier, E. 2013. “The impact of education and 
intergroup friendship on the development of ethnocentrism. A latent growth curve 
model analysis of a five-year panel study among Belgian late adolescents.” 
European Sociological Review, 29(6), 1109–1121. 
Konig, R., Eisinga, R., & Scheepers, P. 2000. “Explaining the relationship between 
Christian religion and anti-Semitism in the Netherlands.” Review of Religious 
Research, 41(3), 373. 
Kunovich, RM. 2004. “Social structural position and prejudice: An exploration of cross-
national differences in regression slopes.” Social Science Research 33(1): 20–44. 
Mayda, Anna Maria. “Who Is Against Immigration? A Cross-Country Investigation Of 
Individual Attitudes toward Immigrants.” Review of Economics and Statistics: 
510–30.  
McLaren, LM. 2003. “Anti-immigrant prejudice in Europe: Contact, threat perception, 
and preferences for the exclusion of migrants.” Social Forces 81(3): 909–936. 
Montgomery, Kathleen A., and Ryan Winter. 2015. “Explaining The Religion Gap in 
Support for Radical Right Parties in Europe.” Politics and Religion: 379–403.  
Mudde, Cas. 2007. Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press. 
O'rourke, Kevin H., and Richard Sinnott. “The Determinants of Individual Attitudes 
towards Immigration.” European Journal of Political Economy: 838–61. 
 RES PUBLICA XXI 
 
 
18 
 
Park, C., Cohen, L. H., & Herb, L. 1990. “Intrinsic religiousness and religious coping as 
life stress moderators for Catholics versus Protestants.” Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 59, 562–574. 
Rowatt, W. C., & Kirkpatrick, L. A. 2002. “Two dimensions of attachment to God and 
their relation to affect, religiosity, and personality constructs.” Journal for the 
Scientific Study of Religion, 41, 637–651. 
Salsman, J. M., Brown, T. L., Brechting, E. H., & Carlson, C. R. 2005. “The link between 
religion and spirituality and psychological adjustment: The mediating role of 
optimism and social support.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31, 
522–535. 
Savelkoul, M., Scheepers, P., Tolsma, J., & Hagendoorn, L. 2011. “Anti-Muslim 
attitudes in the Netherlands:Tests of contradictory hypotheses derived from ethnic 
competition theory and intergroup contact theory.” European Sociological 
Review, 27(6), 741–758. 
Scheepers, P., Gijsberts, M., & Hello, E. 2002b. “Religiosity and prejudice against ethnic 
minorities in Europe: Cross-national tests on a controversial relationship.” Review 
of Religious Research, 43(3), 242–265. 
Schlueter, E., Schmidt, P., & Wagner, U. 2008. “Disentangling the causal relations of 
perceived group threat and outgroup derogation: Cross-national evidence from 
german and Russian panel surveys.” European Sociological Review, 24(5), 567–
581. 
Shapiro, Mike.https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/09/09/when-
it-comes-to-refugees-scandinavia-isnt-quite-the-promised-land/ 
Strabac, Z., & Listhaug, O. 2008. “Anti-Muslim prejudice in Europe: A multilevel 
analysis of survey data from 30 countries.” Social Science Research, 37, 268–286. 
Svallfors, Stefan. 2006. The Moral Economy of Class: Class and Attitudes in 
Comparative Perspective. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.  
Tolsma, J., Lubbers, M., & Coenders, M. 2008. “Ethnic competition and opposition to 
ethnic intermarriage in the Netherlands: A multi-level approach.” European 
Sociological Review, 24(2), 215–230. 
RES PUBLICA XXI  	  
 
19 	  
Van der Brug, W., Fennema, M. and Tillie, J. 2000. “Anti-immigrant parties in Europe: 
Ideological or protest vote?” European Journal of Political Research: pp. 77–102. 
Van der Brug, W. and Fennema, M. 2003. “Protest or Mainstream? How the European 
anti-immigrant parties have developed into two separate groups by 1999.” 
European Journal of Political Research: pp. 55–76.  
Van der Brug, W. and M. Fennema. 2009. “The Support Base of Radical Right Parties in 
the Enlarged European Union.” The Journal of European Integration: pp. 653-
672. 
Ward, Matthew. 2013. “They Say Bad Things Come In Threes : How Economic, Political 
and Cultural Shifts Facilitated Contemporary Anti-Immigration Activism in the 
United States.” Journal of Historical Sociology J Hist Sociol: 263–92.  
Weldon, Steven A. 2006. “Minorities: A Comparative, Multilevel Analysis of Western 
Europe”. American Journal of Political Science 50 (2). 
http://www.jstor.org.proxy.iwu.edu/stable/3694276 (Accessed September 1, 
2015). 
Williams, Michelle Hale. "Can leopards change their spots? Between xenophobia and 
trans-ethnic populism among West European far right parties."Nationalism and 
Ethnic Politics 16.1 (2010): 111-134. 
Yakushko, O. 2008. “Xenophobia: Understanding The Roots and Consequences of 
Negative Attitudes Toward Immigrants.” The Counseling Psychologist: 36–66.  
Zaller, JR 1992. The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
 
  
 RES PUBLICA XXI 
 
 
20 
 
Appendix I: Intolerance by Country 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
